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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 












also known as FRANCISCO ARCEO, 
also known as JESUS RODRIGUEZ, 
also known as JESUS NOYOLA, 







On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-09-cr-00239-001 




Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 2, 2010 
 
BEFORE:  SCIRICA, STAPLETON and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 






STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Appellant Francisco Arceo-Garcia (“Arceo”) pled guilty to illegal reentry into the 
United States.  He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 48 months. 
   In his sentencing memorandum and at his sentencing hearing, Arceo, an illegal 
immigrant deported three times previously for unlawful entry into the U.S., argued for a 
downward variance from his sentencing guidelines range of 46-57 months based on 
several factors:  his cooperation with the government, the “undue severity” of the sixteen 
level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a) for a prior drug trafficking conviction, and 
the sentencing disparities among fast-track and non-fast-track immigration districts.  
Arceo‟s fast-track sentencing disparity argument was the subject of considerable debate 
at the sentencing hearing, and the District Court directed a number of questions to 
counsel concerning it.  At the conclusion of the hearings, the District Court rejected the 
downward variance request but did not address the sentence disparity argument or either 
of the other factors, stating only “[i]n reference to the defendant‟s motion for this court to 
grant a downward variance, that motion is denied.”  App. 144-45.
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  In his consideration 
of § 3553 factors, the District Court discussed only the nature and circumstances of the 
offense, the defendant‟s “involvement with the criminal justice system,” and the need to 
punish him and deter others.  App. 145-47.           
 Although the District Court may well have carefully considered the fast-track 
argument and decided that the defendant did not merit any benefit from such a theory, 
there is an insufficient record to support such a conclusion.  Indeed, the record, 
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particularly when viewed in the context of our case law at the time, is entirely consistent 
with the District Court‟s having reached the result that it did because it believed it was 
without authority to consider Arceo‟s fast-track disparity argument. 
 Section 3553(a)(6) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that in 
sentencing defendants district courts should consider “the need to avoid unwarranted 
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty 
of similar conduct.”  In United States v. Vargas, 477 F.3d 94, 96 (3d Cir. 2007), which 
represented the law of our circuit at the time of Arceo‟s sentencing, the defendant argued 
that “his sentence created an „unwarranted disparity‟ in light of the „fast- track‟ programs 
available to defendants in some other districts.”  The District Court refused to consider 
such disparity in the course of reaching its sentence.  We affirmed and agreed with its 
reasoning for doing so: 
[W]e agree with the District Court when, in addressing 
Vargas‟ § 3553(a)(6) claim, it stated the following:  “[W]hat 
are prohibited under 3553 are unwarranted sentencing 
disparities.  And I think the other two branches of 
Government, the legislative and executive, have made it clear 
that in their view these are warranted sentencing disparities.  
App. at 130-31 (emphasis added).  That is, we agree that any 
sentencing disparity authorized through an act of Congress 
cannot be considered “unwarranted” under § 3553(a)(6). 
 
Vargas, 477 F.3d at 99-100.  In reaching our conclusion, we cited cases from nine of our 
sister circuits which reached a similar conclusion based on Congress‟s approval of fast-
track programs in the PROTECT Act. 
 Shortly after Arceo‟s sentencing, this Court revisited the fast-track disparity issue 




addressed the Supreme Court‟s intervening decision in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 
U.S. 85 (2007), and Spears v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009), and the 
ensuing circuit split regarding the effect of these decisions on the propriety of a 
sentencing court considering fast-track disparity.  While we did not overrule Vargas, we 
recognized the necessity of clarifying its holding: 
 We must clarify Vargas post-Kimbrough, however, to 
the extent that is has been read – as the District Court did here 
– as prohibiting a sentencing court‟s discretion to consider a 
fast-track disparity argument because such a disparity is 
warranted by Congress under§ 3553(a)(6).  That 
interpretation is no longer the view of our Court in light of 
Kimbrough‟s analytic reasoning. 
 
 The fast-track issue should not be confined to 
subsection (a)(6), which concerns “avoid[ing] unwarranted 
sentencing disparities.”  Instead, we hold that a sentencing 
judge has the discretion to consider a variance under the 
totality of the § 3553(a) factors (rather than one factor in 
isolation) on the basis of a defendant‟s fast-track argument, 
and that such a variance would be reasonable in an 
appropriate case. 
 
Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d at 149 (footnote omitted).  Because the District Court in 
Arrelucea-Zamudio had understandably read Vargas as precluding acceptance of the fast-
track disparity argument in all cases, we remanded to provide it with an opportunity to 
reconsider that argument in the course of resentencing. 
 Given the context of the sentencing in this case and the District Court‟s failure to 
give any affirmative indication of an understanding that it was authorized in appropriate 
circumstances to give weight to fast-track disparities, we are unable to exercise our 




District Court to afford it an opportunity to clarify its position in light of our decision 
there. 
 While the court would be within its discretion to sentence Arceo to a within-
Guidelines sentence, and the court gave adequate reasons of punishment and deterrence 
for sentencing Arceo as it did, the court committed procedural error in not ruling on the 
defendant‟s disparity argument.  When a matter is controverted, the District Court must 
state on the record its reasons for denying a defendant‟s motion,  Fed. R. Crim. P. 
32(i)(3)(B); United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 216 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 We will vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
